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A Proposal for Reallocation of Federal Grazing-Revisited
B. Delworth Gardner
Over a quarter of a century ago, I analyzed the allocation procedures utilized by the federal agencies which
administer livestock grazing on the public lands (Gardner
1962). Two factors contributing to grazing misallocation
and reduced range productivity were identified: (1) the
"eligibility" requirements that qualify permittees for grazing privileges prevented the utilization of forage by
ranchers who would value it most, and (2) use-tenure
insecurity resulting from cuts in permitted grazing impeded
private investment in range improvements on the public
ranges. In a second paper, I proposed that the grazing
privilege system be reformed such that efficient allocation of forage and tenure security could be more nearly
achieved (Gardner 1963). Following in this paper is
further discussion of my proposal to create perpetual
grazing rights, why it is still applicable today, and why I
believe that little was done to implement it.

The Allocatlon of Grazing Permits on the Federal
Lands
Some History
When public control of livestock grazing on the public
lands was initiated many decades ago, agency regulations required that rancher applicants be engaged in the
livestock business and that they own or control land or
water base property. This "commensurability" requirement was designed to eliminate the so-called "itinerant"
stockman from consideration for permits. These "nomadic"
livestock producers, often with little or no ranch property
of their own, moved large herds of grazing animals across
vast areas of the West during the various seasons of the
year when forage was available. Commensurability was
thought to promote the stability of the ranching and
derivative industries that make up the local community.
The other major eligibility requirement was "use-priority"
which gave preference to those applicants who were
using the public land prior to governmental regulation.
At the time when government control of grazing was
being considered, ranchers who had been previously utilizing the public lands and paying no fees felt economically threatened. Naturally, they resisted the new regulations. To minimize their political opposition, these ranchers
were given preference by the government for receiving
the avai Iable perm its via the el ig ibi Iity requ i rem en ts. Fees
were set at very low levels, presumably only to cover the
costs of administering the new grazing programs. Agency
The paper has benefited from suggestions by Ray Huffaker, Arden Pope,
John Workman, Dean Lueck and Ed Frandsen. The editor of Rangeland_s, Gary
Frasier and an anonymous reviewer were immensely helpful In shortening and
recasting the paper. Only the author, however, should be blamed for errors m
fact and logic which remain.

boards of local ranchers were given considerable power
to influence grazing policy decisions. These stratagems
had their desired effects. Political opposition by ranchers
was not sufficiently strong to block the proposed regulation and control.
Modern Day l11ues
The system that restricted permit allocation to only
those "qualified" permittees has been incapable of responding to changes in the livestock business and other
pressures on the public lands and thus is becoming
increasingly inefficient (Gardner 1984). Non-permittee
ranchers desire access to the subsidized grazing. This
can be accomplished only by becoming "eligible," often
requiring the purchase of the base property or livestock of
an existing permittee.
With the increase in the demand for outdoor recreation
and the emergence of the environmental movement in the
1960's and 1970's, other outputs from the federal lands
have become increasingly valuable and new pressures
are being brought to reduce livestock grazing. As a consequence, the total animal-unit-months (AUMs) of permitted livestock grazing were reduced, first on the national
forests in the 1950's and 1960's, and later on the public
domain (Gardner 1962). The result has been a waning of
confidence that federal grazing will continue to be available to permittees at favorable terms.
It is axiomatic that successful entrepreneurs must be
capable of responding quickly to changes in technological possibilities, prices, and costs if they are to survive in a
competitive market environment. Yet federal agencies
dictate stocking rates, classes of livestock that can be
grazed, the length of the grazing season and what can and
cannot be done to increase forage yields. Permittees have
little freedom to choose and utilize different grBl:ling
regimes, various grazing intensities, and earlier or later
grazing than dictated by the regulating agency. Also,
permitted grazing may be cut by agency discretion giving
rise to tenure insecurity described above. Incentives are
weak at best for rancher investment in capital improvements that might increase the productivity of the public
ranges and thus benefit all public land users.
Perpetual Grazing Rights Plan
In 1963 I proposed the creation of perpetual grazing
rights. The government would specify the quantity of
AU Ms that could be grazed on a given allotment, the class
of grazing animals (e.g., cattle or sheep), and the season
of use. These rights would be issued to the existing permittees as a substitute for existing permits.
Eligibility requirements would be eliminated and the
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grazing rights could be freely transferred in voluntary
market transactions. Thus, property rights in grazing
would be created that were defined, defendable, and divestible. If the federal government decided that range condition warranted an increase in livestock AUMs, it would
simply create new rights and auction them off to the
highest bidder. If it wanted to decrease grazing, it could
buy up the existing rights at market prices. Very importantly, if other user groups wanted the forage or the grazing allotment without livestock, they could purchase the
rights in the market. The proposal seemed to promote an
efficient allocation of resources and security of tenure
lacking in the existing procedures and yet continued to
give the government final authority to set stocking rates.
I anticipated that the grazing fee issue might be relevant
to the political feasibility of the proposal. If grazing rights
were perpetual and freely transferable among ranchers,
the expected minimum market transfer price of the rights
would be the capitalized differential between the expected
average value of the grazing and the average costs of
taking the forage. One of these costs would be the fee
paid to the government. Thus, the level of the fee and the
value of the right would be inversely related.
At fee levels existing in the early 1960s when the proposal was made, the new rights could have been expected
to be worth more than the permits they replaced because
they were transferable and offered greater economic
security. Thus, unless fees were raised, wealth windfalls
would have been created for the permittees. Since the
alleged "subsidy" to ranchers has always been controversial, it appeared that the political feasibility of the proposal would be enhanced by not directly increasing the
wealth of the permittees. To avoid this problem, I recommended that the fee be fixed at a level which would make
the new rights equal in value to the old permits.
The increased fees would have been attractive to the
taxpayer owners of the public lands and to the government agencies desiring larger budgets. Environmental
organizations would have been sated because they have
always wanted the subsidy to ranchers reduced and more
revenues for range improvements. The ranchers would
have tenure security and a vigorous market in which they
could buy and sell the grazing rights. Thus, the proposal
appeared to be attractive to all the relevant parties.
Then why hasn't the proposal been adopted in the
intervening years? The answer to this question is complex.
In my view, public choice theory provides the most
plausible answer. This theory postulates that given interest groups can manipulate legislative, administrative, and
judicial decisions to their advantage, even though in
aggregate across all interests, the contest for government
favors is likely to be negative-sum. That is, the total gains
captured by the winners of some public action (e.g.,
environmental groups) are less than the total losses suffered by the losers (e.g. rancher permittees). Presumably,
recreational, environmental, and conservation organizations that wanted reduced livestock grazing on the public
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lands believed it was in their interest to retain the existing
permit system and used judicial action and pressure on
the legislative and executive branches to accomplish
their goals. Th is doesn't mean that they are satisified with
the status quo, but they certainly did not want any reforms
that gave definable rights to the livestock permittees.
Evidence that supports this hypothesis is found in two
recent suits: 1) a 1985 suit brought in a federal court to
block "cooperative management agreements" (CMAs)
that were created to implement the "experimental rancher
stewardship" (ESP) programs as authorized by the Public
Rangeland Improvement Act (PRIA), and 2) a 1986 suit
challenging the grazing fee formula also authorized in
PRIA.

The Sult Against Cooperative
Management Agreements
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
of 1976 was very restrictive in the regulations imposed on
ranchers. However, PRIA of 1978 took a halting step forward to loosen these restrictions and give permittees
more flexibility.
Despite evidence to the contrary (Box 1978), FLPMA
simply asserted that the federal rangeland was "continuing to deteriorate" (43 U.S.C. art. 1751, Sec. 401 (b), 1976)
and instituted comprehensive long-run federal management of rangeland for the twin purposes of sustained
yield and multiple use. It authorized the Secretary of Interior to cancel, suspend, or modify permits as punishment
for rule violations; to offer short-term licenses rather than
ten-year permits when they are in the "interest of sound
land management", and to limit the guarantee of renewal
to an offer of "first priority" so long as expiring permit
holders were willing to accept any new conditions of the
Secretary (43 U.S.C. art. 1751, Sec. 402 (a), 1976).
PRIA repeated the assertion of deterioration of public
rangeland and supplemented FLPMA's comprehensive
land management program by authorizing additional
funds for federal rangeland management programs (43
U.S. Code, art. 1901, Sec. 5, 1978). However, PRIA broke
new ground by establishing the Experimental Stewardship Program (43 U.S.C. 1906, Sec. 12, 1978). The ESP
authorized the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture
to" ... explore innovative grazing management policies
and systems which might provide incentives to improve
range condition ... and such other incentives as they may
deem appropriate."
Under this authority, the Secretaries implemented the
5D0 Cooperative Management Agreement program. The
CMAs were cooperative agreements between government officials and grazing permittees who demonstrate
exemplary rangeland management practices. The agreements established mutually determined "performance
standards" for the graziers. Cooperative permittees, viewed
as the stewards of their grazing allotments, were to be
rewarded with increased tenure security. Since arbitrary
cuts could not be made without review, the permittees
were left relatively free to determine the livestock numbers
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revenues that are designated by formula to be spent to
improve range productivity.
The government defendants argued that the level of the
fee has no impact on the quantity of allowable grazing.
Speaking for the Forest Service, "The permitted use level
is determined through the Forest planning and allotment
management planning processes and is set in the grazing
permit. This process occurs entirely independently of
grazing fees. Therefore, physical and biological effects of
permitted livestock grazing are determined by factors
other than the grazing fee levels" (USDA, Finding 1987,
Workman 1988).
Both theoretical and empirical considerations are relevant to this dispute. For various reasons, collectively and
perhaps individually, permittees usually do not actually
graze the number of AUMs authorized. The difference
between permitted and actual use is termed nonuse.
Non use has been recorded by the Forest Service over the
period 1979 to 1986 and has varied from a low of 11.1 % in
1980 to a high of 15% in 1986.
The fact that some nonuse is now occurring at present
fee levels is evidence that for one reason or another some
grazing is not worth what the permittees are being asked
to pay for it. Therefore, raising the fee would almost
surely result in more nonuse. The plaintiffs were technically correct in asserting that a rise in the fee would
reduce livestock grazing. On the other hand, the fact that
many permittees are utilizing the full allowable use
implies that raising the fee would reduce their permit
values but may not affect the quantity of grazing.
What do the available data indicate about fees and
non use? Not much variation in annual nonuse exists. The
government maintains that there is no relationship between the fee and the quantity of grazing demanded over
the years that the PRIA formula has been in effect, 19791986 (USDA, Finding 1987). The government correctly
argued that other factors appear to correlate more closely
with variation in actual use than do grazing fees. "For
example, the costs that livestock producers pay for production of their cattle, and the prices they receive for
those cattle, may influence the level of actual use and
therefore nonuse. A statistical analysis comparing beef
cattle prices in 1979-1986, with the percent of nonuse,
shows a strong negative correlation. That is, as beef cattle
prices increase, percent nonuse tends to decrease. Also,
a statistical analysis for the same period comparing producer prices paid (cost of livestock production), with percent of nonuse, shows a strong positive correlation"
(USDA, Finding 1987).
The problem is that both beef prices received and production costs incurred are terms in the formula for determining the grazing fee. As beef cattle prices rise, the
profitability of grazing should increase and nonuse should
fall, all other things equal. As production costs increase,
the profitability of public grazing should decrease and
non use should increase. As the value of substitute forage
decreases, nonuse of permitted. federal forage should
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increase as ranchers shift to the now cheaper private
substitutes.
In summary, it is clear that changes in the fee itself are
not closely associated with changes in nonuse over the
period of the PRIA formula, although individual components of the fee do seem to be so associated. However,
much variation exists in the physical and economic situations of individual ranchers that would cause them to
value the federal forage at different levels, and no one
really knows how many would opt for nonuse in the face
of substantially higher fees.

Summary and Concluslons
I believe that the nature of the allocation problem on
government-owned ranges has changed over the past 25
years. In 1963, I was concerned primarily about the aHocation of the allowable grazing among potentially competing ranchers. Clearly, the critical allocation problem
now is between livestock producers and other users of the
public ranges.
As in 1963, I see no compelling reasons for maintaining
the eligibility requirements for receiving grazing preferences. There is no question that the allowable quantity of
livestock grazing would be more efficiently allocated if
grazing rights were created along the lines of my original
proposal. Incentives to invest in range improvements
would exist if these improvements were truly economically feasible. Potential users who now regard the public
lands as unavailable to them could easily acquire access
by buying out the ranchers.
In my opinion, there is also little doubt that the quantity
of grazing that is now allowable to livestock could be
much more efficiently utilized if ranchers were given
more management flexibility as was attempted in the
cooperative management program. However, there is little available evidence for this conclusion, except a priori
logic. That stewardship program should be reinstated to
permit us to observe whether or not ranchers would
increase range efficiency and productivity and by how
much.
The level of rancher subsidy and fees will continue to be
a controversial subject. But the ranchers are not the only
ones who benefit more from the public lands than they are
paying. If the environmental organizations and recreationists want to reduce livestock grazing in order to
increase the amount of forage left for their users or for the
public generally, they might think about taxing themselves to buy the ranchers out and/or contribute funds for
range improvement. It is possible that they could do it
more economically under a scheme of transferable rights
to forage than attempting to manipulate political and
legal institutions via rent-seeking expenditures they are
now making.
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